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Abstract—Many mixed-criticality systems are composed of a
RTOS (Real-Time Operating System) and a GPOS (General
Purpose Operating System), and we define this as a mixed-time-
sensitive system. Complexity, isolation, real-time latency, and
overhead are the main metrics to design such a mixed-time-
sensitive system. These metrics may conflict with each other, so
it is difficult for them to be consistently optimized. Most existing
implementations only optimize with part of the above metrics
but not all.
As the first contribution, this paper provides a detailed analysis
of performance influencing factors which are exerted by various
runtime mechanisms of existing mixed-time-sensitive systems. We
figure out the difference in performance across system designs
such as task switching, memory management, interrupt handling,
and resource isolation. We propose the philosophy of utilizing
TrustZone characteristics to optimize various mechanisms in
mixed-time-sensitive systems.
The second contribution of the paper is to propose a Trustzone-
based solution - termed TZDKS - for mixed-time-sensitive system.
Appropriate utilization of TrustZone extensions helps TZDKS to
implements (i) virtualization environment for GPOS and RTOS,
(ii) high efficiency task switching, memory accessing, interrupt
handling and device accessing which are verified by experiments.
Therefore, TZDKS can achieve a full-scale balance amongst
aforementioned metrics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, many applications require integrating components
with different levels of criticality on one physical platform, in
order to meet stringent non-functional requirements relating to
cost, space, weight, heat generation and power consumption.
This kind of system is defined as a mixed-criticality system
[5]. The most common case is that a real-time system and
a non-real-time interactive system are mixed and integrated
on one platform, which is defined as a mixed-time-sensitive
system in this paper, also deemed as a special Dual-Criticalitiy
System [4].
The performance of a mixed-time-sensitive system is de-
termined by many metrics, such as complexity, isolation [9],
real-time latency, and overheads (of merging different OSs).
These metrics may conflict with each other, so can hardly be
consistently optimized. For examples, isolation and complexity
collide with performance or overhead, and real-time latency
collides with performance which is reflected by overhead.
Most existing implementations of a mixed-time-sensitive sys-
tem (e.g. GPOS dual-kernel extending, and virtualization-
based [11] system) have only optimized part of the above
metrics but not all. From observation, we get some conclusions
that, (i) the dual-kernel system has less software levels and
more resources sharing, so it can achieve lower overhead,
and (ii) the virtualization system relies on resource partition
(especially some hardware supports) to achive better isolation
and lower complexity.
As the first contribution, this paper provide a detailed anal-
ysis of performance influencing factors which are exerted by
various runtime mechanisms of existing mixed-time-sensitive
systems. We figured out the difference in efficiency across
system designs such as task switching, memory management,
interrupt handling, and resource isolation. We propose the phi-
losophy of utilizing TrustZone characteristics to optimize vari-
ous mechanisms in a mixed-time-sensitive system. The second
contribution of the paper is to propose a Trustzone-based
solution for mixed-time-sensitive systems, termed TZDKS.
Appropriate utilization of TrustZone extension helps TZDKS
implement (i) virtualization environment for GPOS and RTOS,
(ii) high efficient task switching, memory accessing, interrupt
handling and device accessing which are verified by experi-
ments. Therefore, TZDKS achieves a full-scale balance among
aforementioned metrics. We believe that our TZDKS is a
safe and low-cost solution as the TrustZone-build-in ARM
platforms have been used in almost all engineering fields.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents
our motivation; Section III introduces related work; Section
IV gives the designing philosophy; Section V describes the
TZDKS implementation; Section VI evaluates the performance
of TZDKS, with conclusions offered in Section VII.
II. MOTIVATION
There are many approaches to design and implement a
mixed-time-sensitive system, which can be classified as two
sorts. The traditional way is to extend popular GPOS, such as
Linux. This method usually deploys a small real-time kernel
at the underlying of GPOS, and takes GPOS as a pseudo
real-time task. We call it a dual-kernel system [10]. Dual-
kernel systems do not require extra hardware support, and only
introduces low overhead [10]. However, it needs to modify
the GPOS kernel heavily, which result in much more cost in
complexity and flexibility. Additionally, insufficient isolation
between OSs leads to many security and reliability problems
[15]. In contrast, virtualization-based method becomes a more
popular and rapid method to design a mixed-time-sensitive
system through integrating RTOS and GPOS in two virtual
machines. This method can provide better security isolation
and lower complexity, so it has the advantages of simple
development and ideal isolation. However, it heavily relies
on the hardware support, which increases the cost of the
whole system [12]. And extra software levels also increase
the system’s overhead. Moreover, the hypervisor must be
redesigned to meet the real-time requirement.
The TrustZone technology, which is developed to provide
a trusted executing environment, has attracted our attention.
With the hardware isolation support, a GPOS may run on the
TrustZone-enabled CPU without modification, which leads to
a low development cost. Furthermore, as a light-weight isola-
tion scheme, TrustZone introduces few overhead in software.
Therefore, its characteristics do help to develop a mixed-time-
sensitive system with all-round balance amongst complexity,
isolation, real-time latency, and overhead.
A new idea is proposed that combine strong points of dual-
core and virtualization by the utilizing TrustZone. We will
design TZDKS based on this idea.
III. RELATED WORK
A. Two Common Solutions for Integrating Embedded System
A dual-kernel mixed-time-sensitive system introduces a
small real-time kernel into the underlying of GPOS, and takes
GPOS as a pseudo real-time task. RTOS has a higher priority
than GPOS, and consequently GPOS only runs during the
idle periods of RTOS. That is to say, when the IDLE task
is switched on, a switcher module will be invoked to save the
state of RTOS, and restores the state of GPOS, then RTOS will
be activated as the timer (belongs to RTOS) interrupt GPOS,
and will do rescheduling for the real-time tasks. So this is
called as idle-scheduling strategy. RTLinux, RTAI, Xenomai
and RTThread [6] [10] are products of dual-kernel system, and
are widely applied in industrial systems.
In a virtualization-based mixed-time-sensitive system, a
hypervisor may be used to manage shared resources and
isolate the OSs, and a GPOS can execute aside a RTOS
in two virtual machines (VM). Such architectures can be
found in industrial control systems where the RTOS takes
over the time-critical control of a machine while the GPOS
runs, for example, the visualization software. Futher examples
are single-processor smartphones where an RTOS is used to
manage critical tasks of the radio communication while a
GPOS hosts the typical set of mobile phone applications. The
up-to-date avionics systems specification - ARINC 653 [14]
- is another example of the virtualization-based mixed-time-
sensitive system. This specification requires integrating many
subsystems (such as flight control system, environment control
system, and amusement system) into a virtualized platform on
modern aircraft.
These two mixed-time-sensitive systems always behave
oppositely in many aspects, and detailed analysis will be
presented in section IV.
B. Introduction of TrustZone and TrustZone-based virtualiza-
tion
ARM TrustZone [16] is a hardware-based security extension
technology incorporated into ARM processors. It enables a
single physical processor to execute instructs in one of two
possible operating worlds: the normal world and the secure
world. The isolation mechanisms of TrustZone are well de-
fined. Access permissions are strictly under the control of the
secure world, which forbids access from the normal world.
As the processor only runs in one world at a time, to run in
the other world requires context switch. This is achieved via
a special instruction called the Secure Monitor Call (SMC).
In order to facilitate an application in the normal world to
connect to and invoke a secure service in the secure world,
the GlobalPlatform consortium develops the TEE client API
specification [8].
The idea of using TrustZone as a virtualization technique
in embedded systems was first introduced by Frenzel et al
[7]. ARMs TrustZone security extensions can be utilized to
virtualize a system in two ways:
(1) Use system access capabilities of the secure world to build
a hypervisor that can control virtual machines running
in the normal world. SierraVisor is an example of such
way.The SierraVisor Hypervisor [3] leverages hardware
security extensions included in ARM TrustZone-enabled
devices to run multiple, high-level operating systems con-
currently. The guest operating systems are aware of the
fact that they are running on top of a hypervisor, so minor
modifications must be made to the guest operating sys-
tems. Each guest kernel and applications run in their usual
privilege mode, supervisor and user mode respectively.
Furthermore, each guest executes in an isolated container
with low overhead.
(2) Use the efficient switching mechanism of the Secure zone
Monitor to host a dual-OS system (Secure zone OS and
Normal zone OS). Most TrustZone-based virtualization
systems [13] [15] are constructed in this way. SafeG [15]
is designed to concurrently host a RTOS and a GPOS
on TrustZone-enabled ARM SoC devices. SafeG takes
advantage of ARM’s TrustZone security extensions to
efficiently partition the system into Trusted and Non-
Trusted states, which provides full system access to trusted
software, and limits the capabilities of software running
in Non-Trusted state.
IV. BALANCING DESIGNATION PHILOSOPHY OF TZDKS
A. Dual-kernel vs Virtualization
Here we analyse four metrics - complexity, isolation, real-
time latency, and overhead - between two types of dual-
criticality systems: tasks management, memory management,
event management, and runtime environment. Afterwards, we
will compare the performance in two systems based these four
metrics.
A.1 Tasks management. Both systems adopt a two-level
model for task management, and the main difference exists in
OS switching. Dual-kernel system’s RTOS kernel do schedul-
ing not only for its RT tasks, but also for GPOS. As a contrast,
a virtualization system adds an extra hypervisor to manage the
switching operation of GPOS/RTOS VMs. Figure 1 (a) gives
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Fig. 1. Main Task Switch Process in Different Systems
a typical process how a given real-time task τ and GPOS are
alternately executing, while the process with the same goal in a
virtualization system is given in figure 1 (b). As shown, GPOS
is interrupted by a real-time timer, and the interrupt handler
stores the runtime context of GPOS, then restore the context
of the RTOS scheduler. If τ is ready, the RTOS scheduler
will restore the context of τ . When RTOS scheduler finds no
runnable task in the queue, the idle task will be switched on,
and it will invoke a system call to store the context of itself,
and restore the context of GOPS. In figure 1 (b), a hypervisor
runs at the under-layer of two VMs, so extra scheduling and
context storing/restoring take place in the process of switching
VMs.
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A.2 Memory model. In dual-kernel system as shown in
figure 2 (a), some physical memory is retained and locked
by RTOS, so GPOS can only use other physical memory,
though they both adopt two level (virtual/physical) address
translation. Virtualization system normally adopts three level
(virtual/real/physical) address translation shown in figure 2 (b).
A.3 Interrupt handling. Dual-kernel system ensures that
interrupts are first treated by RTOS. Interrupts belonging to
GPOS will be put into a pipeline and then be progagated to
GPOS when there are no more runnable tasks in the RTOS. In
virtualization system, all the interrupts will be firstly treated
by the hypervisor (or domain 0 OS), then be forwarded to
VMs.
A.4 Runtime environment. Dual-kernel system integrates
two OSs by patching the GPOS kernel and adding many
intercoupling function in two kernels, so there is no logical
independent environment for GPOS and RTOS, and no ef-
fective defence to harmful interference from each other. As
known, virtualization systems have well-defined and isolated
virtualization environments for each OS.
Now we have the following observations and results by
comparison.
• C.1 Dual-kernel system achieves better performance in
terms of real-time latency for the following reasons.
– it has less context store/restore operations (3 times
vs 5 times in figure 1).
– it has shorter interrupt response latency, because the
interrupt goes directly to the RTOS.
– it has shorter memory access latency, because the
address translation has less layers.
• C.2 Dual-kernel system achieves better performance in
overhead, because
– it has less context store/restore times.
– it has less times of scheduling in task switching (1
time vs 2 times in figure 1).
– it has less wast CPU time, because it saves all the
idle time of RTOS to run GPOS.
– it has less memory access overhead.
• C.3 Virtualization system is much better than dual-kernel
system in aspects of complexity and isolation.
– lower complexity is benefited from the advanced
VM capabilities, such as cloning, template-based
deployment, check-pointing, and live migration.
– virtualization provides not only software but also
hardware isolation, which brings it a high level of
reliability and security.
B. Designation Philosophy of TZDKS
TZDKS is derived from the following fundamental princi-
ples.
• at least two kernels are required to handle different time-
sensitive tasks management.
• simple and reduced structures. Dual-kernel system has
less components and management levels, which is the
main cause of the less overhead and the lower latency.
• hardware virtualization employment. Both isolation and
high performance require that.
• replacement or simplification of the hypervisor. This
software level decreases the performance.
Normal virtualization technologies seem more heavy-weight
than above principles, while TrustZone - a lightweight iso-
lation extension of ARM - comes into our view. We can
easily get two isolated domains (or virtual machines) with the
assistance of the following TrustZone hardware mechanisms.
• With hardware support, each physical CPU is virtualized
into two virtual CPUs: one for the secure world and the
other for the non-secure world. Cache of each level is
also virtualized and isolated.
• TrustZone Address-Space Controller (TZASC) allows
partition of memory, which can be exploited to guarantee
strong spatial isolation between two worlds. Therefore,
TrustZone-enabled system only has/needs MMU support
for single-level address translation.
• TrustZone Protection Controller (TZPC) allows devices to
be (statically or dynamically) configured as secure or non-
secure, that allows the isolation of devices at the hardware
level.
• Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC) supports the coex-
istence of secure and non-secure interrupt sources. It
allows the configuration of secure interrupts with a higher
priority, and also allows to assign IRQs and FIQs to
secure or non-secure interrupt sources.
Some opensource projects like Trusted Firmware [1] have
provided sound support for two domains and virtual-machine-
like interfaces to Linux and general RTOS, and also give us
ideal platform fundamentals.
So it seems that it is a greater obstacle to pursue greater
performance in designing this new system. We are fortu-
nate enough to discover that many mechanisms provided by
TrustZone are very helpful to improving the performance of
TZDKS - our TrustZone-based Dual-Kernel System.
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• With the assistance of hardware memory isolation, sin-
gle level address translation can be implemented in the
TZDKS virtual memory subsystem, and makes it have the
same efficiency as the memory mapping in a bare-metal
OS (figure 3).
• Through the well configuration of GIC, interrupts can be
routed to the owner kernel by hardware, that avoids any
software interrupt forwarding. Both kernels benefit from
the simplification of interrupts management and timer
mechanism (figure 3).
• Devices can be partitioned according to requirement, so
the IO software stacks can be simplified and the IO
latency can be kept at the lowest level.
• Some software characters of TrustZone can also be ex-
ploited. For an example, we can use the monitor mode as
a context switcher for two kernels, so as to replace the
functions of a hypervisor. We will implement the kernel
switching shown in Figure 4, apparently it has the same
efficiency as the traditional dual-kernel system.
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In a word, TrustZone extension provides sufficient support
to achieve a balance among isolation, virtualization, and
performance for dual-kernel structure.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF TZDKS
A. Architecture of TZDKS
As shown in figure 5, there are two software stacks lo-
cated in the two worlds of TrustZone-enabled environment on
TZDKS. The secure world stack is composed by the monitor
module, RTOS and real-time tasks/services, and provides a
real-time environment for the development of applications
which need to guarantee specific deadlines. While the normal
world stack is composed by GPOS and applications, and pro-
vides a rich environment for running user-machine interfaces
as well as internet-based applications and services.
B. Components of TZDKS
1) RTOS: RTOS is the partly modified version of a typical
real-time system - µcOSII. The main modifications on the
µcOSII kernel side includes: (i) a new port to enter-into/exit-
from GPOS, (ii) implementation of idle-scheduling, that is to
modify the idle task as a gate for GPOS. (iii) optional support
for standard TEE (Trusted Execution Environment).
2) Monitor: The monitor component executes in a slave
mode though it has the highest executing level, because it has a
lower priority than that of real-time tasks. In fact, the monitor
is only activated through two ways. One is through a SMC
call, the other is through FIQ when GPOS is on. Functions
of the monitor component includes: (i) SMC service ports (to
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support communications between worlds), (ii) timer interrupt
handler for RTOS in the period of GPOS running, (iii) world
switcher (saves the state of the current world, and restores the
state of the ready-to-run world).
3) GPOS: GPOS is a enhanced Linux system. Basically,
Linux can run in the normal world without modification. Some
new modules have been added to Linux for the communication
with RTOS, including the kernel driver for TrustZone(which
encapsulates SMC (Secure Monitor Call) ports as a pseudo-
device), application libraries (which provides communication
ports and standard TEE service ports defined by the Globle-
Platform consortium), some daemon services for the RTOS
requirement, and a configuration module for RTOS.
C. Working Process of TZDKS
The system starts booting on the secure world side by per-
forming a series of operations including hardware initialization
and configuration, as well as allocating the different resources
to the predefined worlds and loading the exception/SMC
vectors to the predefined addresses. Then the RTOS kernel
is loaded and started. The whole system will run with RTOS
as the main body, while the GPOS will be loaded and executed
as a special task of RTOS, i.e. the IDLE task. Each OS own its
private timer source. Different interrupt types are configured
to each OS (IRQ for GPOS, and FIQ for RTOS). IRQs are
masked during the secure world execution for the priority of
real-time tasks.
VI. EVALUATION
We implemented our TZDKS on an Hikey development
board with Trustzone-enabled. Hikey has a octa-core ARM
Cortex-A53 CPU up to 1.2 GHz per core, 2GB 800MHz
LPDDR3 memory, 8GB eMMC on-board storage, 4 PL011
UARTs, platform peripherals, and secure peripherals. We
modified the power management functions in the under level
of the software so that only one core is left running in the
system.
To evaluate the performance of TZDKS we targeted four
metrics discussed in Section IV: Complexity, Overhead, isola-
tion, and RT latency. Because isolation is hardly to be verified
by experiments, we conduct a discussion around supporting
mechanisms.
A. System Complexity
Benefiting from the light-weight virtualization ability pro-
vided by TrustZone technology, we can rapidly develop the
prototype of TZDKS in a few weeks. At the side of adapted
µcOSII, we only modifed two exception handler functions and
IDLE task body to make the OS running in the secure world.
At the Linux side, it can run directly in the normal world using
the kernel sourced from kernel.org.
TABLE I
NECESSARY CODE LINES ADDED TO THE TZDKS COMPONENTS
Linux µcOS Trusted Firmware etc.
Code Lines 0 < 300 < 100
Besides that, some code lines were added to the Trusted
Firmware to enable a timer for µcOS. Applications and their
developments can be migrated to the new system easily. Table
I lists the code lines needed to develop the TZDKS. We note
that Xenomai require a patch to Linux kernel which has more
than 15 thousands code lines [2]. TZDKS obviously has a very
low complexity notwithstanding it is only a prototype system.
B. Evaluation on Isolation
Here we discuss the isolation between OSs about three
resources: (i) memory, (ii) interrupt, (iii) peripheral. As known,
the traditional dual-kernel system has no effective isolation
support for above three resources. So we just exploit compara-
tion between TZDKS and the virtualization system. Note that
we mainly consider the isolation for RTOS in a dual-criticality
system.
In TZDKS, access permission to memory, cache and periph-
erals are under the control of hardware controllers (TZASC,
TZPC), and those resources which belong to RTOS can not be
accessed by GPOS. Interrupts are configured (in GIC, which
is a hardware interrupt controller) as two groups: group 0 and
group 1. Group 0 interrupts are only hardware routed to RTOS,
while group 1 are only to GPOS. These hardware components
are built in almost all current ARMv8 processors.
In the virtualization system, memory isolation is normally
supported by hardware assistance (such as VTx). Hardware
isolation for peripherals and interrupts always require extra
hardware (such as VT-d), which increases the system cost.
Therefore, TZDKS provides fine isolation for RTOS through
low-cost hardware.
C. Overhead
Considering that it is difficult to find a method to test
the integral performance of TZDKS, We use UnixBench to
measure the comprehensive performance of Linux (GPOS)
with zero load in the RTOS. The results will reflect the
performance of TZDKS. Then we compare the performance
with other two Linux systems. One is a native Linux on a bare-
metal, the other is a Linux in a Xen virtual machine. From
the results shown in figure 6, we can see that there is almost
no performance loss in the GPOS of TZDKS when the load
of RTOS is very light. As a contrast, Linux in the Xen virtual
machine has obvious performance loss.
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D. Interrupt Latency for RTOS
For the interrupt latency test, we measure the time from
when a interrupt is triggered to when the interrupt handler
begins to run. Our experiment begins countering when a SGI
(Software Generated Interrupt) instruction is executed, and
ends countering at the start-point of the SGI handler function.
Two thousands times SGIs were repeated in the experiment,
and we lists the maximum latency, minimum latency, average
latency, and MSE (Mean Squared Error) of latencies in table
II. Results show that the interrupt latency in RTOS of TZDKS
is slightly influenced by GPOS, but is still deterministic and
short enough for most real-time applications.
TABLE II
INTERRUPT LATENCY FOR RTOS
Max
(cycles/µs)
Min
(cycles/µs)
Average
(cycles/µs)
MSE
(cycles/µs)
µcOS in
TZDKS
2530 / 2.11 410 / 0.34 1001.1 / 0.83 632.6 / 0.53
Bare-metal
µcOS
1377 / 1.15 380 / 0.32 823.5 / 0.69 313.1 / 0.26
E. Context Switch Latency for Real-Time Tasks
In this measurement, we measure the CPU cycles used in
the process shown in upper half of Figure 4, e.g. the longest
time that a ready real-time task τ waits to run. Results in table
III show that the longest time is less than 20 µs in TZDKS
when GPOS has very high load (especially when there are
many EXECL calls), so the context switch performance is
good enough for most applications. Here we find the fact that
this latency is heavily influenced by GPOS, which is out of our
expectations. A possible cause is hardware resources conflict
in the CPU when the system executes switching between two
worlds, and more research needs to be done about it in further
work.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The mixed-time-sensitive system, which combines different
types of OSs on unique hardware platform, has wide require-
ments and applications in many fields such as robot, aviation
etc. Two traditional solutions, dual-kernel and virtualization,
TABLE III
CONTEXT SWITCH LATENCY
Max
(cycles/µs)
Min
(cycles/µs)
Average
(cycles/µs)
MSE
(cycles/µs)
GPOS to RT-
task in TZDKS
19475 / 16.23 1757 / 1.47 4884.3 / 4.07 3619.8 / 3.02
Task switch in
Bare-metal µcOS
1629 / 1.15 642 / 0.54 1079.5 / 0.90 312.8 / 0.26
provide just reverse merit and demerit in different perfor-
mances. This paper proposes an idea to realize the dual-kernel
system based on the TrustZone isolation, and give the design of
TZDKS to verify this idea. TZDKS achieves suitable balance
among complexity, isolation, interoperation, and overhead.
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µŸǼŸəÞsɠ ?ōǣǼsǋ ?ǢĶÞ_sōǣǼsǋ
ǼŸÞŘǣsǋǼɴŸȖǋȖŘÞǼŘŎsÌsǋs
ƻŘ ^ŸŘ¶ ʿĶŘ DȖǋŘǣ ʿ ʉÌs ğÞŘ¶ ʿ ɳŘ ^ÞŘ¶ ʿ ĵŸŘ¶ µŸ
OÌÞsɚÞŘ¶ƻsǋ¯ŸǋŎŘOsDĶŘOs¯Ÿǋ^ȖĶ˚
NǋÞǼÞOĶÞǼɴǢɴǣǼsŎDǣs_ŸŘǊōǻǋȖǣǼʉŸŘs
ǻʉ^ħǢ ÝŎƼĶsŎsŘǼǼÞŸŘ
ǋOÌÞǼsOǼȖǋs
ǻɠŸ ǣŸ¯Ǽɠǋs ǣǼOĨǣ ǋs ĶŸOǼs_ ŸŘ ǻʉ^ħǢʳ ǻÌs ǣsOȖǋs
ɠŸǋĶ_ ǣǼOĨ ƼǋŸɚÞ_sǣ  ǋsĶ˚ǼÞŎs sŘɚÞǋŸŘŎsŘǼ ¯Ÿǋ ǼÌs
_sɚsĶŸƼŎsŘǼ Ÿ¯ ƼƼĶÞOǼÞŸŘǣ ɠÌÞOÌ Řss_ ǼŸ ¶ȖǋŘǼss
ǣƼsOÞ¯ÞO _s_ĶÞŘsǣʳ ǻÌs ŘŸǋŎĶ ɠŸǋĶ_ ǣǼOĨ Þǣ OŸŎƼŸǣs_ Eɴ
µƻŷǢ Ř_ ƼƼĶÞOǼÞŸŘǣʰ Ř_ ƼǋŸɚÞ_sǣ  ǋÞOÌ sŘɚÞǋŸŘŎsŘǼʳ
DŸŸǼÞŘ¶ ˓ ǊȖŘŘÞŘ¶ Ÿ¯ ǻʉ^ħǢ
ōÞɮs_˚NǋÞǼÞOĶÞǼɴ ^sǣÞ¶Ř
 ǻʉ^ħǢ ǣǣÞ¶Řǣ ǊǻŷǢ ǼÌs ÌÞ¶ÌsǣǼ ƼǋÞŸǋÞǼɴ ǼŸ ǊǻŷǢ
ǼÌǋŸȖ¶Ì Þ_Ķs˚ǣOÌs_ȖĶÞŘ¶ ƼŸĶÞOɴʳ
 ƻȖǋs Þ_Ķs˚ǣOÌs_ȖĶÞŘ¶ ŎĨsǣ ǼǋŸȖEĶsǣ ʹsʳ¶ʳ ǼÞŎsǋ ĶŸǣǣʰ
ƼǋÞŸǋÞǼɴ ǋsɚsǋǣsʺ ¯Ÿǋ µƻŷǢ sɚsŘ ɠÌsŘ Nƻȕ Þǣ ŘŸǼ ¯ȖĶĶɴ
ŸOOȖƼÞs_ Eɴ ǊǻŷǢʳ
 rŘÌŘOs_ Þ_Ķs˚ǣOÌs_ȖĶÞŘ¶ ƼŸĶÞOɴ Þǣ ÞŘ_ȖOs_ Eɴ __ÞŘ¶
ŘŸǼÌsǋ ǋsĶ˚ǼÞŎs ǼǣĨ Ĳµ ĶǣŸ ǣsǋɚÞŘ¶ ǣ  OŸŘǼÞŘsǋ
Ÿ¯ µƻŷǢ EȖǼ ɠÞǼÌ  ɚǋÞEĶs ƼǋÞŸǋÞǼɴʳ
OĨŘŸɠĶs_¶sŎsŘǼǣ
˒ ōȖOÌŸ¯ǼÌsɠŸǋĨǋsƼŸǋǼs_ÞŘǼÌÞǣƼƼsǋǼŸŸĨƼĶOsɠÌÞĶsǼÌsʩǋǣǼȖǼÌŸǋ
ɠǣɚÞǣÞǼÞŘ¶ǼÌsȕŘÞɚsǋǣÞǼɴŸ¯ɳŸǋĨʳʳ
˒ ǻÌÞǣɠŸǋĨÞǣǣȖƼƼŸǋǼs_EɴǼÌsŗǼÞŸŘĶŗǼȖǋĶǢOÞsŘOs®ŸȖŘ_ǼÞŸŘŸ¯
NÌÞŘʹŗŸʳ˥ˠˤ˟ˡˤˠ˟ʺʳ
NŸŘǼOǼÞŘ¯ŸǋŎǼÞŸŘ
˒ ƻŘ^ŸŘ¶ʳǢOÌŸŸĶŸ¯NŸŎƼȖǼsǋʰŗǼÞŸŘĶȕŘÞɚsǋǣÞǼɴŸ¯^s¯sŘǣsǻsOÌŘŸĶŸ¶ɴ
˒ rŎÞĶʲƼŘ_ŸŘ¶˔ŘȖ_Ǽʳs_ȖʳOŘ
(YDOXDWLRQ
3ODWIRUP +LNH\ GHYHORSPHQW ERDUG D RFWDFRUH $50
&RUWH[$ &38  *+] SHU FRUH *% 0+]
''5 0HPRU\
&RPSOH[LW\
 9HU\ IHZ SDUWV RI WKH RULJLQDO V\VWHP QHHG WR EH
PRGHILHG WZR H[FHSWLRQ KDQGOHU IXQFWLRQV DQG ,'/(
WDVN RI ȝF26,,
 1R PRUH WKDQ  PRGHILHG FRGHOLQHV DUH QHFHVVDU\
LQ SRUWLQJ ȝF26,, LQWR WKH VHFXUH ZRUOG
2YHUKHDG
ĵǼsŘOɴ ¯Ÿǋ ǊǻŷǢ
ʳ
7='.6 'HVLJQ 3KLORVRSK\
ǻʉ^ħǢ Þǣ _sǋÞɚs_ ¯ǋŸŎ ǼÌs ¯ŸĶĶŸɠÞŘ¶ ¯ȖŘ_ŎsŘǼĶ
ƼǋÞŘOÞƼĶsǣʳ
 Ǽ ĶsǣǼ ǼɠŸ ĨsǋŘsĶǣ ǋs ǋsǇȖÞǋs_ ǼŸ ÌŘ_Ķs _Þ¯¯sǋsŘǼ
ǼÞŎs˚ǣsŘǣÞǼÞɚs ǼǣĨǣ ŎŘ¶sŎsŘǼʲ ǊǻŷǢ  ? µƻŷǢ
 ǣÞŎƼĶÞ¯Þs_ ǣǼǋȖOǼȖǋsǣʳ ^ȖĶ˚ĨsǋŘsĶ ǣɴǣǼsŎ Ìǣ Ķsǣǣ
OŸŎƼŸŘsŘǼǣ Ř_ ŎŘ¶sŎsŘǼ ĶsɚsĶǣʰ ɠÌÞOÌ Þǣ ǼÌs
ŎÞŘ ǋsǣŸŘ Ÿ¯ ǼÌs Ķsǣǣ ŸɚsǋÌs_ Ř_ ǼÌs ĶŸɠsǋ
ĶǼsŘOɴ ÞŘ ōǻǢǢʳ
 Ìǋ_ɠǋs ɚÞǋǼȖĶÞʊǼÞŸŘ ǣȖƼƼŸǋǼʳ ǊsǇȖÞǋs_ Eɴ EŸǼÌ
ÞǣŸĶǼÞŸŘ Ř_ ÌÞ¶Ì Ƽsǋ¯ŸǋŎŘOsʳ
 ǋsƼĶOsŎsŘǼ Ÿǋ ǣÞŎƼĶÞ¯ÞOǼÞŸŘ Ÿ¯ ǼÌs ÌɴƼsǋɚÞǣŸǋʳ
ÌɴƼsǋɚÞǣŸǋ _sOǋsǣsǣ ǼÌs Ƽsǋ¯ŸǋŎŘOsʳ
ǻʉ^ħǢ Ķsɚsǋ¶sǣ ǻǋȖǣǼʉŸŘs ŎsOÌŘÞǣŎǣ ǼŸ ¶sǼ ǼɠŸ
ÞǣŸĶǼs_ _ŸŎÞŘǣʳ
 Nƻȕ ɠŸǋĶ_ǣ ǣɠÞǼOÌ OƼEÞĶÞǼɴ
 ǻʉǢN ʹǻǋȖǣǼʉŸŘs __ǋsǣǣ˚ǢƼOs NŸŘǼǋŸĶĶsǋʺ ¯Ÿǋ
ŎsŎŸǋɴ ÞǣŸĶǼÞŸŘ
 ǻʉƻN ʹǻǋȖǣǼʉŸŘs ƻǋŸǼsOǼÞŸŘ NŸŘǼǋŸĶĶsǋʺ ¯Ÿǋ _sɚÞOs
ÞǣŸĶǼÞŸŘ
 µÝN ʹµsŘsǋÞO ÝŘǼsǋǋȖƼǼ NŸŘǼǋŸĶĶsǋʺ ¯Ÿǋ ÞŘǼsǋǋȖƼǼ
ÞǣŸĶǼÞŸŘ
ǻʉ^ħǢ ĶǣŸ Ķsɚsǋ¶sǣ ǻǋȖǣǼʉŸŘs ŎsOÌŘÞǣŎǣ ǼŸ
ÞŎƼǋŸɚs ÞǼǣ Ƽsǋ¯ŸǋŎŘOsʳ
 ǣÞŘ¶Ķs ĶsɚsĶ __ǋsǣǣ ǼǋŘǣĶǼÞŸŘ
 Ìǋ_ɠǋs ǋŸȖǼs_ ÞŘǼsǋǋȖƼǼǣ
 ǣÞŎƼĶs Ýˀŷ ǣŸ¯Ǽɠǋs ǣǼOĨǣ Ř_ ǣÌŸǋǼ Ýˀŷ ĶǼsŘOɴ
 ŎŸŘÞǼŸǋ˚ŎŸ_s˚Eǣs_ ǣɠÞǼOÌsǋ ¯Ÿǋ _ȖĶ˚ĨsǋŘsĶ
ʳ
ÝŘǼǋŸ_ȖOǼÞŸŘ
 ŎÞɮs_˚OǋÞǼÞOĶÞǼɴ ǣɴǣǼsŎ OŸŎƼŸǣs_ Ÿ¯  ǊǻŷǢ Ř_  µƻŷǢ Þǣ
_s¯ÞŘs_ ǣ  ŎÞɮs_˚ǼÞŎs˚ǣsŘǣÞǼÞɚs ǣɴǣǼsŎ ʹōǻǢǢʺʳ ōŸǣǼ
sɮÞǣǼÞŘ¶ ōǻǢǢǣ OŘ ŸƼǼÞŎÞʊs ƼǋǼǣ Ÿ¯ ŎÞŘ Ƽsǋ¯ŸǋŎŘOs
ŎsǼǋÞOǣ ʹNŸŎƼĶsɮÞǼɴʰ ÞǣŸĶǼÞŸŘʰ ǋsĶ˚ǼÞŎs ĶǼsŘOɴʰ Ř_
ŸɚsǋÌs_ʺ EȖǼ ŘŸǼ ĶĶʳ
ŷȖǋ OŸŘǼǋÞEȖǼÞŸŘǣʲ
 _sǼÞĶs_ ŘĶɴǣÞǣ Ř_ OŸŎƼǋÞǣŸŘ Ÿ¯ Ƽsǋ¯ŸǋŎŘOs
ÞŘ¯ĶȖsŘOÞŘ¶ ¯OǼŸǋǣ OǋŸǣǣ ǣɴǣǼsŎ _sǣÞ¶Řǣ ǣȖOÌ ǣ ǼǣĨ
ǣɠÞǼOÌÞŘ¶ʰ ŎsŎŸǋɴ ŎŘ¶sŎsŘǼʰ ÞŘǼsǋǋȖƼǼ ÌŘ_ĶÞŘ¶ʰ Ř_
ǋsǣŸȖǋOs ÞǣŸĶǼÞŸŘʳ
 ƼǋŸƼŸǣs ǼÌs ƼÌÞĶŸǣŸƼÌɴ Ÿ¯ ȖǼÞĶÞʊÞŘ¶ ǻǋȖǣǼʉŸŘs
OÌǋOǼsǋÞǣǼÞOǣ ǼŸ ŸƼǼÞŎÞʊs ɚǋÞŸȖǣ ŎsOÌŘÞǣŎǣ ÞŘ ōǻǢǢʳ
 ƼǋŸƼŸǣs ǼÌs _sǣÞ¶Ř Ÿ¯ ǻʉ^ħǢ ʹǻǋȖǣǼʉŸŘs˚Eǣs_ ^ȖĶ
ħsǋŘsĶ ǢɴǣǼsŎʺʰ OÌÞsɚÞŘ¶  ¯ȖĶĶ˚ǣOĶs EĶŘOs ŎŸŘ¶ǣǼ
¯ŸǋsŎsŘǼÞŸŘs_ Ƽsǋ¯ŸǋŎŘOs ŎsǼǋÞOǣʳ
ŷEǣsǋɚǼÞŸŘ
rɮÞǣǼÞŘ¶ ōǻǢǢǣ OŘ Es OĶǣǣÞ¯Þs_ ǣ ǼɠŸ ǣŸǋǼǣʲ
 ^ȖĶ˚ĨsǋŘsĶ ǣɴǣǼsŎǣʳ rɮǼsŘ_ÞŘ¶ ƼŸƼȖĶǋ µƻŷǢ Eɴ
_sƼĶŸɴÞŘ¶  ǣŎĶĶ Ǌǻ ĨsǋŘsĶ Ǽ ǼÌs ȖŘ_sǋĶɴÞŘ¶ Ÿ¯ µƻŷǢ Þʳsʳ
ɭsŘŸŎÞ
 ɚÞǋǼȖĶÞʊǼÞŸŘ˚Eǣs_ ǣɴǣǼsŎǣʳ ÝŘǼs¶ǋǼÞŘ¶ ǊǻŷǢ Ř_ µƻŷǢ
ǼÌǋŸȖ¶Ì ǼɠŸ ɚÞǋǼȖĶ ŎOÌÞŘsǣ ŸŘ ŸŘs ƼÌɴǣÞOĶ ƼĶǼ¯ŸǋŎʳ Þʳsʳ
ǊÝŗN ˥ˤˢ
ǻÌs ®ŸĶĶŸɠÞŘ¶ ŸEǣsǋɚǼÞŸŘǣ ¯ǋŸŎ OŸŎƼǋÞǣŸŘ ¶Þɚs Ȗǣ
ÞŘǣƼÞǋǼÞŸŘ ǼŸ _sǣÞ¶Ř ǻʉ^ħǢʳ
Nʳˠ ^ȖĶ˚ĨsǋŘsĶ ǣɴǣǼsŎ OÌÞsɚsǣ EsǼǼsǋ ĶǼsŘOɴ
˛ Ķsǣǣ OŸŘǼsɮǼ ǣǼŸǋsˀǋsǣǼŸǋs ŸƼsǋǼÞŸŘǣ
˛ ǣÌŸǋǼsǋ ÞŘǼsǋǋȖƼǼ ǋsǣƼŸŘǣs ĶǼsŘOɴ
˛ ǣÌŸǋǼsǋ ŎsŎŸǋɴ OOsǣǣ ĶǼsŘOɴ
Nʳˡ ^ȖĶ˚ĨsǋŘsĶ ǣɴǣǼsŎ ǣȖ¯¯sǋǣ ¯ǋŸŎ Ķsǣǣ ŸɚsǋÌs_
˛ Ķsǣǣ OŸŘǼsɮǼ ǣǼŸǋsˀǋsǣǼŸǋs ǼÞŎsǣʳ
˛ Ķsǣǣ ǼÞŎsǣ Ÿ¯ ǣOÌs_ȖĶÞŘ¶ ÞŘ ǼǣĨ ǣɠÞǼOÌÞŘ¶
˛ Ķsǣǣ ɠǣǼs Ÿ¯ Nƻȕ ǼÞŎs
˛ Ķsǣǣ ŎsŎŸǋɴ OOsǣǣ ŸɚsǋÌs_
Nʳˢ əÞǋǼȖĶÞʊǼÞŸŘ ǣɴǣǼsŎ Ìǣ EsǼǼsǋ OŸŎƼĶsɮÞǼɴ Ř_ ÞǣŸĶǼÞŸŘʳ
